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THE CONGLOMERATE MERGER:
A NEED FOR CLARITY
JOHN R. REILLY*
The Supreme Court terms of 1965-66 and 1966-67 brought to
the center of antitrust attention a relatively new form of business
arrangement. In two careful opinions, the Court affirmed Federal
Trade Commission orders requiring large corporations to divest
themselves of acquired concerns that were neither competitors of
the respondent companies nor substantial purchasers of the prod-
ucts the respondent companies marketed.' The condemned acquisi-
tions were conglomerate in nature; that is, there was no competitive
relationship between the acquiring and the acquired firm. Yet be-
cause of certain factors, the Court found the acquisitions had the
requisite effect under section 7 of the Clayton Act 2 to merit can.
cellations.
To those of us engaged in the antitrust field, there is reason
to agree that "the conglomerate is where the action is" today.8 We
are now experiencing the third great corporate merger movement
in our history, a movement which has already been acknowledged
although it is apparently still gathering steam. According to Dr.
Willard Mueller, the Chief Economist of the FTC, if the present
rate of increase in business concentration continues, the country's
200 largest corporations, by 1975, "would control two-thirds of the
total assets of American manufacturing corporations." 4 And in the
forefront of this massive drive toward concentration is the con-
glomerate merger, the most prevalent type of corporation acquisi-
* J.D. University of Iowa; Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, 1963.67-
member of the firm of Pierson, Ball & Dowd, Washington, D.C. The article is an
extension of remarks made by the author before the Antitrust Section of the Ohio
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1 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated
Foods, 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
2 No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire
the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
3 Dixon, Conglomerate Merger Fever: The 1967 Virus, Address before ABA Sec-
tion of Antitrust Law, April 13, 1967.
4 Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subconin. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at
519 (1964-65).
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tion occurring today.5
The threat posed to our present business system by the con-
tinuing wave of conglomerate mergers is real. The Chairman of the
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, in urging in-
creased antitrust surveillance of conglomerate acquisitions, pointed
out that hearings before his committee concerning such acquisi-
tions "demonstrated the ability of a corporation with a dominant
position in one industry to spread its economic power into others."
The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
prior to assuming office, suggested that the conglomerate acquisition
may have less economic justification than other types of mergers.7
Subsequently, he has indicated the possible need for additional
legislation to deal with the problem.8 Moreover, in March of last
year, the Congressional Joint Economic Committee observed that
with the current wave of conglomerate mergers "the number of
firms with substantial discretionary pricing power will rise sharply."9
The Committee warned that in the absence of "strong antitrust
intervention," the only answer, "if the public is to be protected
. .. may be some sort of statutory price-wage surveillance and,
perhaps, actual controls."' 0
But while the threat is real, it is not so great that, at least at
this time, it requires application of a per se rule of illegality or sup-
pressive legislation. Most conglomerate mergers are presently be-
lieved to have little or no adverse competitive effect. It is doubtful,
however, that either the proponent of a conglomerate or its possible
prosecutor could, at this point, offer a quick and decisive evaluation
concerning the law as applicable to a pending conglomerate acquisi-
tion.
When one considers the size of the budgets of the Federal Trade
Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Jus-
tice" in the light of the duties assigned to these agencies, it can be
readily understood that public education must rank ahead of prose-
5 Id. at 516. See also Reilly, Conglomerate Mergers-An Argument for Action,
61 Nw. U.L. RE%. 522, 529 (1966).
6 Hart, Emerging Paradoxes in Antitrust, 30 ABA ANTrtUsr SEcMoN 80, 82 (1966).
7 Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAt. L.
REv. 1313, 1329-31 (1965). See also Blair, The Conglomerate Merger it Economics and
Law, 46 Gao. L. J. 672, 679-80 (1958).
8 The Washington Post, Jan. 7, 1968 § E, at 12, col. 1.
9 JOINr Ecooic CoMfITEE OF CONGREss, ANtITRUSt AND NATIONAL EcoNoMic
PoLicy, 5 TRADE RaG. REP. 50,166 at 55,219 (Mard 17, 1967).
10 Id.
11 The Commission's budget for the fiscal year 1966 was $13.5 million. 265
A, -rmusT & TRADE REG. RE. A-18, 19 (August 9, 1966).
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cution in the weaponry of antitrust. Both agencies must rely heavily
on the voluntary cooperation of the business community in carrying
out their assigned tasks. Such cooperation has always been extended,
but only when the law has been made clear. The need for clarity is
felt both by government and the business community. The business-
man does not want to pass up legitimate opportunities for expansion
merely because of uncertainty of the law. And the government, if it
must arrest the merger movement, can do so only through coopera.
tion born from understanding.
This article is meant to keep the conglomerate merger problem
within the realm of public debate. It advocates increased efforts by
the government to provide the public and the business community
with a precise explanation of the application of the Celler-Kefauver
Act to conglomerate acquisitions.12 To these ends, the article: (1)
illustrates the rise of the conglomerate merger by briefly tracing the
merger movement of our country since 1900; (2) explains the va-
rious classes of conglomerate acquisitions; (3) describes the reasons
for government concern regarding these mergers; (4) summarizes
government action against conglomerates; and (5) suggests gen-
erally various methods through which it is believed that the govern-
ment can achieve the cooperation of the business community in
combatting the problem of the conglomerate movement.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE CONGLOMERATE MERGER MOVEMENT
Economic historians inform us that the country has undergone
two great corporate merger movements other than the one now in
progress. 13 These movements have done much to create, tear down,
and rebuild the present structure of our economy. The first of these
movements, occurring at the turn of the century, was a long series
of huge mergers which established some of the great corporations in
such basic fields as steel, petroleum, sugar refining, and a long list
of other industries.14 The pace was rapid: approximately fifty sig-
nificant manufacturing and mining mergers were consummated
yearly during the period from 1898 to 1902, each absorbing ten or
eleven firms.15 The movement was apparently stimulated by politi-
12 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
13 G. STOCKINGS & M. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 15-52 (1951),
41 (Levin ed. 1958); R. L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1895.
1956, at 110 (1959).
14 One historian has pointed out that the relative position of present day oligo-
polists "is accounted for mainly by the merger movement at -the turn of the century."
J. WESTON, THE ROLE OF MERGERS IN THE GROWTH OF LARGE FIRMS 49 (1961).
15 Whitney, Mergers, Conglomerates, and Oligopolies: ,I Widening of Antitrust
Targets, 21 RuTrRS L. REv. 187, 188 (1967).
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cal events of the time and a bullish stock market. Opportunity
blended with reason as advances in communications and transporta-
tion expanded geographic markets.
The second merger movement, in the late 1920's, affected a
number of new industries (such as automobiles and parts, various
branches of food manufacturing and food retailing) and stratified
concentration in many of the older industries.16 At its peak, it ac-
counted for the elimination of approximately one thousand manu-
facturing and mining corporations annually.17 This merger move-
ment, and its predecessor, came to an end, not because of antitrust
enforcement, but because of stock market crashes. The effect of the
two movements was to transform very materially the structure of
the American economy.
The current merger movement began in the closing years of
World War II. It represents the largest such movement in our his-
tory. The Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Economics defines
a "large" merger as one wherein the acquiring corporation has as-
sets of ten million dollars or more.18 From the enactment of the
Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950 until 1966, there were 923 "large"
mergers in manufacturing and mining, the combined assets of the
acquired firms totaling 33.4 billion dollars.' 9 In 1966, the Commis-
sion recorded a new high in "large" merger activity. Ninety-eight
mergers were consummated, the combined assets of the acquired
corporations totaling four billion dollars.20 The industries principally
involved were electrical machinery, chemicals, non-electrical equip-
ment, food and kindred products, and transportation equipment.2'
Without respect to size, other than to exclude de minimis mergers
(those involving substantially less than one million dollars in as-
sets) the annual acquisition rate has risen from 213 in 1943 to 995
in 1966.22 The record mark was set in 1965, when 1,008 mergers
were completed.23
16 J. BAN, LNDUSTRIAL ORcANIZATION 196 (Wiley Ed. 1959).
17 W. THORP & W. CRoWDER, TnE STaucrTuE OF INDUSTRY 233 (TNEC Monograph
No. 27, 1941).
18 STAFF OF Suacom.. No. 5, Housa COmm. ON Tin JuDitCARY, 90"t CONG. 1ST
SEms., THE CEuER-KEFAUVER ACT: SxTEE:N YFAMS OF ENFORCEMFr 8 (Comm. Print
1967).
19 Id. at 4.
20 Federal Trade Commission Press Release, Mergers Reached Record Levels
Last Year, Feb. 24, 1967, at 3. The Commission maintains an annual list of firm dis-
appearances via merger in manufacturing and mining dating back to 1940.
21 Id. at 3,9.
22 Id. at 5.
23 Id.
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The current merger movement has come to be identified with
the rise of the conglomerate. If we divide the experience since 1948
into three six-year periods, we find that of all the large mergers in
manufacturing and mining, horizontals represented thirty-one per-
cent of the total in the first period, declined to less than twenty-five
percent in the second, and finally to only twelve percent in the most
recent period.24 Actually, in the most recent six-year interval, 1960-
1965, large horizontal mergers have declined not only proportion-
ately, but also in absolute number.25 In short, horizontal mergers
have become less and less important as the merger movement itself
has progressed.
Both vertical and conglomerate mergers, on the other hand,
have increased. Vertical mergers rose from ten percent to fourteen
percent and then to seventeen percent of the total.20 Conglomerate
mergers rose from fifty-nine percent to sixty-two percent and finally,
in the last six-year period, to seventy-one percent of the total of all
large mergers.27
II. THE CLASSES OF CONGLOMiERATES
The FTC was first alerted to the conglomerate merger when
interest was aroused in amending section 7 of the Clayton Act in
the late 1940's to plug the "asset-only" loophole. At that time, the
Commission was asked to prepare data and submit testimony on
the nature of the new developments in particular industries and ef-
forts were made to classify and analyze mergers in terms of their
potential effects on competition.28
Of the mergers that were occurring, many could be easily ear-
marked as horizontals, for these involved the merging of two or more
concerns producing the same or similar products and serving the
same or similar geographic markets. The vertical merger was also
easy to visualize. It brought together buyers and sellers at various
stages in the flow of products to the final consumer. But there were
a large number of other types of mergers that did not fit convenient-
ly into these pigeonholes. Efforts were made to categorize these sports
on the basis of the functional relationship between the merging com-
panies. What the Commission discovered, however, was that while
24 Economic Concentration Hearings, supra note 4, at 501 et seq. Data has been
updated through 1965 through reference to F.T.C. sources. See note 18, supra.
25 THE CELLER-KEFAUVER AcT: SIXTEEN YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT, supra. n. 18 at 8.
28 Id.
27 Id.
28 See Federal Trade Commission, The Present Trend of Corporate Mergers and
Ecquisitions, S. Doc. No. 17, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. (1947).
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some mergers reflected functional relationships in either production
or distribution, in others these relationships did not exist.
The Commission broadly categorized tiese mergers as conglom-
erate.29 After subsequent analysis, it further placed them in three
subcategories: geographic market extension, product extension and
"other". For example, in what has been designated a "market ex-
tention" merger, a company engaged in a particular line of business
might acquire another firm engaged in the same product line, but
serving other geographic areas.30 A "product extension" merger
would involve two firms producing quite distinct products. The
companies, while not directly competitive with one another, are
functionally related in production or distribution. An example of
this type of merger is that reviewed in the recent Procter & Gamble
case3 1-the union of a soap manufacturer with a bleach producer.
The last category of conglomerates concerns mergers between com-
panies that have neither of these relationships, such as a locomotive
manufacturer and a tobacco company.32 The common thread run-
ning through the three types of conglomerates is that they bring to-
gether firms serving separate economic markets.
III. THE CONCERN ABOUT CONGLOMERATES
It has been said that classification is the beginning of wisdom. It
certainly is not, however, the end of analysis. The question which
led to the foregoing classifications of mergers was: do such mergers
adversely affect competition? The Commission's answer was "yes",
in certain cases. As a result, when Congress passed the Celler-Ke-
fauver Act it did not limit the application of section 7 to mergers
between competitors. Instead Congress made it clear that the amend-
ment covered all mergers, horizontal, vertical and conglomerate,
where the proscribed anticompetitive effects were found or could
be predicted.33 Congress did not set forth detailed criteria of just
29 Id.
30 See Foremost Dairies, Inc. E1963-65 Transfer Binder] TRADE Ra.. REP. S 17,217
at 22,285 (FTC 1965); Beatrice Foods Co. [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRAE Rac. REP.
j 17,244 at 22,317 (FTC 1965).
31 FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Go., 386 U.S. 568, 577-78 (1967); See also General
Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 944 (3rd Cir. 1967).
32 Professor Turner calls such acquisitions "pure conglomerates" or mergers "in
which there are no discernible economic relationships between the businesses of the
acquiring and the acquired firm." Turner, supra note 7, at 1315.
33 The House Report on the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendment to Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1951), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964) stated:
Mhe bill applies to all types of mergers and acquisitions, vertical and
conglomerate as well as horizontal, which have the specified effects of sub.
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how conglomerate mergers could injure competition, leaving it to
the Commission and the courts to arrive at their own determinations
in this relatively uncharted area.
The proponents of the Celler-Kefauver Act were apprehensive
about both high market concentration (market power held by the
leading firms in an industry) and aggregate concentration (the share
of all manufacturing held by the top one hundred or two hundred
corporations) .3- Conglomerate acquisitions, of course, have an effect
upon national concentration in manufacturing. But they do not re-
sult in an immediate change in the level of concentration or the
shares of particular competitors in any relevant market. Aside from
their contribution to aggregate concentration, conglomerate mergers
may result in the transfer of market power from one economic mar-
ket to another. They may affect other structural conditions im-
portant to the existence of competition within a relevant market.85
For example, prior to entry by the acquiring firm, the market
power within a concentrated industry may have been checked to a
considerable extent by such factors as vigorous competition from
alternate products, the potential competition of a large company in
a functionally related industry, the ease of market entry by small
companies and the existence within the market of a fringe of small
producers. "Although," as one learned commentator has pointed
out, "none of these market characteristics is likely to afford a com-
pletely satisfactory substitute for the competitive stimulus found
in an unconcentrated market [they] may nevertheless provide signifi-
cant limitations on market power." 80
All of these market checks could be directly affected by a con-
glomerate merger. The entry of a substantial potential competitor
stantially lessening competition or tending to create a monopoly. It. R. Rep,
No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
34 Id. at 2, 3.
35 As succinctly stated in a congressional staff report the impact of a conglom.
erate merger is
often found in its side effects, rather than in immediate repercussions ....
The conglomerate corporation . . . can weather a storm of competition or
emerging technical obsolescence in one of its areas of interest, while seeking
opportunities in other newly developing fields. It has staying power, ready
access to the capital markets, accessibility to new Government research and
development grants, and supply contract awards.
STAFF OF SELECT Co urTrEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, H. R. 87TH CONG. 20 SEsS., MERGERS
AND SUPERCONCENTRATION, ACQUISITION OF 500 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL AND 50 LARGEST
MERCHANDISING FiRas 44 (Comm. Print 1962).
36 Antitrust in an Expanding Economy, address by Robert A. Hammond (then
Chief, Division of Mergers, Federal Trade Commission) before National Industrial
Conference Board Conference. March 4, 1965.
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via the acquisition route, although it would not increase market con-
centration, could raise considerably the barriers to further market
entry, place small firms at a severe competitive disadvantage, and
give the dominant firms an increased opportunity to benefit price-
wise from a more secure oligopolistic position. 7 If the substantial
potential competitor chose to enter such a market through internal
expansion, the result predictably would be different. If the industry
were oligopolistically structured, such an intervention might upset
the "tight little island" of "contented competition."
The potential for monopolization for a firm serving a number
of markets is enormous, for, if need be, the conglomerate can move
his resources against a particular market. As Professor Corwin Ed-
wards, one of the leading authorities on the economics of the con-
glomerate corporation, has said, "a conglomerate need not be in-
ternally coherent, but its strength and strategy transcend the dis-
cipline of any particular market." It "operates in a series of dif-
ferent markets, in each of which it encounters different competitors
and different conditions of demand and supply and thus may be
able to charge different prices and make different profits." 3s If the
new market is isolated from the conglomerate corporation's other
markets, there is no problem of competitive feedback. There are
many classic Sherman Act cases involving this kind of predation,
and notwithstanding the protestations of some academic economists
to the contrary, predatory pricing and discriminatory pricing that
"erodes competition" is a fact of industrial life both old and current
in antitrust experience.3 9
On the other hand, as a number of markets in which a firm
operates expands, the firm may find that it is meeting many of the
same competitors in different areas. This "multiplicity of their con-
tracts" may "blunt the edge of their competition." 40 The prospect
of retaliation in various other markets must be seriously considered
when the use of advantage in one market is contemplated. A quiet-
37 See J. BAiN, CONDrroNS OF ENTRY AND THE EMERGENCE OF MONOPOLY, MONOP-
OLY AND COMPETTON AND THEnt REGuLATION 215, 226-36 (1954); J. Bitr NDuTsnAL
ORGANiZATIoN 173-76, 249-51 (1967); CAVE.S, A. raucAN INDusmY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCr,
PERoRMAN CE 22-28 (1964).
38 Testimony of Convin D. Edwards, Economic Concentration Hearings, supra,
note 4, pt. 1 at 36, 38. See also Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and
Law, 46 Gao. L. J. 672 (1958).
39 See e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. 386 US. 685 (1967); Lloyd
A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
40 Economic Concentration Hearings, supra note 4, at 45.
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life attitude may prevail. "Like national states, the great conglom-
erates may come to have recognized spheres oE influence and may
hesitate to fight local wars vigorously because the prospect of local
gain is not worth the risk of general warfare."'41
Not only does a "multiplicity of ... contacts" offer a prospect
of easy competition, but it also offers the prospect of collaboration
among firms to insure and perpetuate the "easy life." Reference is
made to the art of systematic reciprocity."2 Conglomerate A supplies
various subsidiaries of conglomerate B. Conglomerate B supplies va-
rious arms of conglomerate A. The latter says to B, "you buy from
me and I will patronize you." As a result, considerations of price,
quality and service are ignored, market foreclosure in more than
one area is achieved, and economic stagnancy is encouraged. 43
IV. THE COMMISSION AND CONGLOMERATES
From the enactment of the Celler-Kefauver amendment 4" to
the end of fiscal year 1967, the two antitrust agencies filed a total
of 206 merger complaints. 45 Of this number, 153 complaints chal-
lenged acquisitions by manufacturing and mining concerns.40
Ninety-four of these complaints involved "large" acquisitions in-
volving combined assets of 5.3 billion dollars, or about ten percent
of all large mergers consummated during the period of reference.47
The majority (forty-eight) of section 7 challenges of large ac-
quisitions involved horizontal combinations. Approximately twenty-
seven percent of all large horizontal acquisitions consummated dur-
ing the 1951-1966 period called for public action.4 8 Seventeen per.
41 Id.
42 For discussions of anticompetitive business reciprocity see addresses by John
R. Reilly, Antitrust Aspects of Reciprocity, before Salesmen's Association of the Chem-
ical Industry, February 18, 1965 and Reciprocity-The End of Innocence, before The
Trade Relations Association, Inc., September 18, 1967; Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing
and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARv. L. REv. 873 (1964).
48 At least two large conglomerates have been recent subjects of charges alleging
anticompetitive reciprocity. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods, Corp. 380 U.S. 592 (1965);
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y., 1966). See also
Federal Trade Commission Press Release, January 24, 1968 (Affidavit of Discontinu-
ance by American Standard, Inc., concerning reciprocity practices).
44 The Act was signed by President Truman on December 9, 1950.
45 STAFF OF SuBco vIr. No. 5, HousE CO,%1nu. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TIl CON., 1s5r
SEss., THE CELLER-KEFAUVER Aar: SIXTEEN YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT 8 (Comm. Print
1967).
40 Id. at 4.
47 Id. at 9.
48 Id. at 7.
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cent of the large verticals contracted during the period were sub-
jects of suit.4 9 While conglomerate acquisitions accounted for al-
most one-quarter of the large mergers consummated, only three
percent of such mergers were brought before the courts.50
A. The Commission's Approach to the Analysis of Conglomerates
As with horizontal and vertical acquisitions, the Commission's
initial, and still primary, approach to conglomerate acquisitions in-
volves test cases. The boundaries of the law are probed through
selected actions. When decisions or guidance are obtained, the law
is applied across the board; and when possible, guidelines are pro-
mulgated.51 During the pendency of the test case, however, there
is no assurance that a "hard line" may not be taken with respect
to those acquisitions similar to, and contemporaneous with, the
merger subjected to judicial test.
To date, the Commission's conglomerate test cases have in-
volved very large corporations. There are many reasons for this;
but paramount to the enforcement agencies is the fact that when
the size of combining corporations is great, the impact of the
combination on competition is likely to be equally great.
B. Market-Extension Conglomerates
The Commission's principal effort against conglomerates has
involved the market-extension class of acquisitions. Some nineteen
percent in terms of numbers and twenty percent in terms of assets
of such mergers consummated from 1951 through 1966 have been
challenged by one of the antitrust agencies.52
It is appropriate that the Commission's primary thrust against
conglomerates concern the market-extension variety. In the Com-
mission's Report to the Congress, which was largely instrumental
in the amendment of section 7, special emphasis was placed on the
danger to competition posed by such mergers.5 3 The dairy industry
served as the principal illustration used in the report. 54
49 Id. at 8.
50 Id. at 9.
51 See Federal Trade Commission, Enforcement Policy With Respect to Mergers
in the Food Distribution Industries, January 3, 1967.
52 THE CELtLR-KEFAUVvR ACT: SIXTEEN YEARS OF EN FORCEENT.r, supra note 45, at 8.
53 Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Merger Movement 37 (1918).
54 See H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949). The Borden Company's
acquisitions during the period between 1940 and 1947 were expressly noted by tib
committee who reported the bill that later became the Celler.Kefauvcr Amendment.
According to another study, by 1948 mergers had accounted for thc following per-
centages of growth by three national dairy firms: National Dairy Products Co., 64
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1. Market-Extension Mergers in the Dairy Industry
The Commission's initial proceeding against market-extensions
through merger involved Foremost Dairies.55 The complaint cial-
lenged fifty-two acquisitions by one of the largest dairies in the
country.50 The Commission subsequently held that ten of the ac-
quisitions violated section 7. Nine of these acquisitions were hori.
zontal in nature and one amounted to a market-extension merger.
With regard to the latter acquisition, the Commission's analysis
stressed the factor of potential competition.57 After observing that
concentration within local markets was high, that there was a defin-
ite trend toward national concentration in the dairy industry, and
that there were substantial barriers to market entry existing within
the industry, the Commission concluded that relief from local oli-
gopolies and a developing national oligopoly would have to come
from the internal expansion into local markets of companies al-
ready operating within the industry. As stated by the Commission:
When market concentration is high, the main, and some-
times the only restraint on the use of market power by oligo.
polistic sellers is potential competition. This makes it impera-
tive that especially those independent firms with the capacity
to offer present and potential competition must not be elimin-
ated by their potential rivals.58
The Commission's reliance on the factor of potential com-
petition in analyzing market-extension acquisitions was further ex-
pounded in its proceedings in Beatrice Foods. According to the
complaint, Beatrice, at the time of suit, was the third largest dairy
company in the nation; one whose growth was largely attributed
to a pattern of acquisitions. In cancelling several of Beatrice's mar-
ket-extension mergers, the Commission made the following points:
(a) The degree of concentration within a market determines
the competitive strategy employed by its members.
In markets where one or a very few firms control a large
part of the total sales, there is a tendency for all firms to refrain
from vigorous price competition. Each large seller knows that
if he makes an across-the-board price cut, the inroads on his
%; Beatrice Foods Co., 63%; and Borden Company, 75%. J. WEsroN, Tug ROLE
OF AMERGERS IN THE GROWTH OF LARGE FIRMS 141 (1953).
55 Foremost Dairies, 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962).
56 In 1950, Foremost's sales were $48,000,000. During the period covered by the
complaint, 1951-1955, respondent acquired firms with combined sales of $342,446,744. In
1955, respondent had sales of $388,068,990.
Id. at 1049.
57 Id. at 1087-89.
58 Id. at 1089.
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major competitors' market shares will be so palpable that they
will be compelled immediately to make a corresponding price
cut-and that consequently there is little advantage to be gained
from price cutting. The small firms in such a market are also
inhibited from initiating price competition. They know that the
majors will react promptly, perhaps with drastic effect, to any
attempt to disturb the price structure.59
(b) Other market factors may limit the-power of sellers with-
in an oligopolistic market.
One such force is the condition of entry by new competi-
tors. It may be such that many firms can and promptly do enter
the market and establish themselves as viable and substantial
competitors, thereby eroding the market power of the dominant
sellers. Moreover, the mere prospect of new competition may
have a salutary effect. The large seller in a concentrated market
knows that the entry of new competitors would jeopardize the
stable price structure of the market and might well lead to low-
er prices, as a result of greater competition, and lower-profits.
He also knows that if prices in the market are so high as to make
it easy for a new competitor to cover his costs, make a healthy
profit, and still be competitive with the firms presently operat-
ing in the market, the attractiveness of entry to prospective con-
petitors will be great, and the likelihood of actual entry sub-
stantial.60
(c) Potential competition may have a salutary effect on, com-
petition within a highly concentrated market.
It disregards business realities to view such a firm [a po-
tential competitor], which may be as much a real competitive
factor as the firm currently selling in the market, as being en-
tirely "outside" the market, or to deny that, just as the elimina-
tion of an actual competitor may adversely affect the competi-
tive structure of a market, so may the elimination of a potential
competitor.61
Both the Foremost and Beatrice matters terminated in consent
orders prior to review by the courts. Other proceedings involving
market extension conglomerates within the industry were settled
by consent orders prior to determination by the Commission.62 The
59 Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TmADE REc. RE. ' 17,244 at
22,33D (FTC 1965).
60 Id., at 22,330.
61 Id at 22,330.
02 The Borden Co., [1963-65 Transfer Binder] TRAD- REG. RP. 16.869 at 21,860
(FTC 1964), Order accepting agreement containing order to cease and desist; Na-
tional Dairy Products Corp., [1963-65 Transfer Binder] TRAME REc. REP. 16,282
at 21,110 (FTC 1963), Order waiving notice and accepting agreement containing order
to cease and desist.
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essence of the dairy cases was that when markets become highly
concentrated, rivalry between and among the leading firms in the
market is likely to be dulled. The members of the industry become
"interdependent;" they tend to avoid price competition and tacitly
or otherwise collaborate to hold prices above competitive levels.
This may work if entry is difficult. Even when entry is difficult,
however, the large producers in other geographic markets may
threaten to scale the entry barriers and share in the profits. So even
the threat of potential competition may hold "monopolizing" in
the local market in check. On the other hand, if the potential com-
petitor comes into the market by buying one of the dominant firms,
this restraining influence is eliminated, and at the same time, the
barriers to other new entrants are raised even further.
2. Food Retailing
In the area of food retailing, the Commission has issued a
number of complaints attacking market-extension through acquisi-
tion, only one of which has been the subject of a final Commis-
sion decision, and none of which has been reviewed by the courts.03
Nevertheless, the one case judged by the Commission and the ex-
pertise developed through similar cases settled by consent orders
and industry-wide hearings, led to the promulgation of merger
guidelines pertaining to horizontal, vertical and market-extension
acquisitions within the food retailing industry.04
The Commission's actions in this area began in 1959 through
the issuance of complaints against the National Tea Co. and Kroger.
As of this writing, five "chains" have been challenged by the Coi-
mission, the attacked mergers being either horizontal ones or con-
glomerate market-extensions. Another "chain" was the subject of
63 The Commission issued Section 7 complaints against the National Tea Co.,
[1959-60 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 27,881 at 36,947 (FTC 1959); Grand
Union Co., [1961-63 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 15,680 at 20,511 (FTC 1962):
Kroger Co., [1959-60 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP, 27,885 at 86,954 (FTC
1959); Consolidated Foods Corp., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP, 17,403
at 22,607 (FTC 1965); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE RC,
REP 17,694 at 22,989 (FTC 1966). The sole case decided by the Commission was
National Tea Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,463 at 22,694
(FTC 1966). The respondent did not appeal this decision.
64 Federal Trade Commission, Enforcement Policy with Respect to Mergers in
the Food Distribution Industries, January 3, 1967. According to the Commission, these
"guidelines" represent an attempt to "spell out as clearly as possible those [food re-
tailing industry] mergers which the Commission's experience and knowledge suggest
as most likely to have anticompetitive consequences." In essence, the guidellne pro.
-hibit mergers which result in combined annual food store sales in excess of $!00
million annually.
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a proceeding brought by the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice. 5 Together, these complaints challenged mergers account-
ing for sales of 760 million dollars.6 All but one of the Commis-
sion's proceedings have been terminated by orders, and three have
resulted in divestitures o7
The National Tea record vividly demonstrated how market
power could be spread from one local market to another through a
series of market-extension acquisitions; the results being not su-
perior economic efficiency, but rather the use of market power to
extract high returns on investment through higher prices to the
consumer and discriminatory price concessions demanded from sup-
pliers, and the promotion of a "quiet-life" form of competition en-
joyed by national firms in local markets.0 8
The record revealed that during the period from 1951-1959,
National Tea acquired twenty-six corporations owning some 485
retail groceries in 188 cities. The acquired companies were, at
the time of acquisition, healthy and profitable enterprises. By 1959,
National was operating over nine hundred stores in approximately
five hundred cities.09 The company's market position could be recog-
nized in 399 of these markets. "In 258 of these 399 cities, respondent
had 10% or more of the market; in 175 of them, 15% or more; in
120, 20% or more; in 73, 25% or more; and in 29 cities, more than
,5% of the market."70 In the lowest level of market control, Na-
tional enjoyed less than five percent of the business (some forty-
eight cities). In the top level, it enjoyed a market share of more
than thirty-five percent (some twenty-nine cities).71 There was a
direct correlation between market share achieved through acquisi-
tion, or other reduction in market membership, and the profits
achieved. The company experienced no earnings in those cities in
65 THE CELxr-KEFAuvER Acr: SIxTEEN YEARS OF ENFORCEMEr , supra note 45,
at 20.
66 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.05 (b) (Page 1965).
67 National Tea Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. Rr'. S 17,463 at
22,694 (ETC 1966), 10 year ban against further acquisitions; The Grand Union Co.,
[1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,265 at 22,365 (FTC 1965), Divesti-
tures and ten-year merger ban; Winn-Dixic Stores, Inc., [1965-67 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 1 17,694 at 22,989 (FTC 1966), Divestitures and ten-year merger
ban; Consolidated Foods Corp., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP'. j 17.403
at 22,607 (FTC 1965), Divestitures and proscription against further mergers.
68 For a penetrating discussion of the National Tea decision see Mueller, Anti-
trust and Economics: A Look at "Competition," 10 ST. Louts U. L. J. 482 (1960).
69 National Tea Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE Ric. REP. 1 17,463 at
22,694 (FTC 1966).
70 Id. at 22,699.
71 Id. at 22,700.
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which its market share was in the lower level; it lost some five cents
on each sales dollar.7 2 In those cities in which its market power
was evident, however, its earnings well exceeded three percent of
sales. 73 "And in its single most profitable city, its stores had earnings
of approximately 7 cents per dollar of sales. This translates into an
after-tax return of some 40% on stockholders' investment." 74
Yet, as pointed out in the Commission's opinion, National
Tea offered no argument concerning superior economic efficiency.
Instead, the company readily acknowledged that its own vast opera-
tion (nine hundred stores in eighteen states with yearly sales of ap-
proximately 800 million dollars) offered no efficiency over large,
one-outlet competitors."5 Moreover, the National Tea record demon.
strated the legitimacy of concern pertaining to "multiplicity of
contacts" among conglomerates. National and other growing
"chains" met each other, mainly because of market-extension ac-
quisitions, in more and more markets. According to one of Na.
tional's executives, "interstate chains pretty well shared [our]
opinion" about competition. Therefore, to the witness, his greatest
competition came from the "local competition which operated
more than one store. ' 76 This competition provided the prime
source for National's acquisitions.
3. The Department Store and Bread Industries
In recent years, the Commission has also proceeded against
market-extension acquisitions in the department store and bread
industries. The complaints charged that the challenged mergers:
(1) eliminated potential competition; (2) raised barriers to mar-
ket entry; (3) disadvantaged small firms operating within the rele-
vant markets; and (4) contributed to pronounced industry trends
toward concentration. 77 As of this writing, there have been three
proceedings in each industry. All have resulted in consent settle-
72 id. at 22,699.
73 Mueller, supra note 68, at 509.
74 Id. at 509-10.
75 National Tea Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,463 at
22,700 (FTC 1966).
76 Id. at 22,698.
77 Continental Baking Co., [1960-61 Transfer Binder] TRADE RaG. RzP. 1 28,774
at 37,382 (FTC 1960) ; Campbell Taggart Associated Bakerici, [1960-61 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 28,851 at 37,410 (FTC 1960); American Bakeries Co., [1965.67
Transfer Binder] TRADE RE. RaP. 17,695 at 22,990 (FTC 1966), Federated Dcp't
Stores, [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE Ran. RaP. 17,508 at 22,460 (FTC 1965),
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE RE. RaP. 17,502 at
22,769 (FTC 1966); May Dep't Stores Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE RE.
RaP. 17,684 at 22,983 (FTC 1966).
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ments.7T In only one of these settlements was divestiture required
of market-extension acquisitions, and therein a minority of the
Commission termed the relief "token" in nature.79 In the other five
proceedings, the respondent companies agreed to refrain from
further industry acquisitions without first securing Commission ap-
proval. The Commission's reasoning behind such settlements may
not be found in any of these matters.
C. Product-Extension Mergers
Since the enactment of the Celler-Kefauver Act, the great
bulk of "large" conglomerate mergers has been of the product-
extension variety. A total of 424 of the 590 "large" conglomerate
acquisitions consummated during the period from 1951 through
1966 have been labeled as product-extensions.80 Ten such mergers
have been challenged by the government."' Three Commission
cases have reached the courts, all resulting in orders requiring can-
cellation of the challenged acquisitions through divestitures.,"-' Sev-
eral others have been settled, 3 one such settlement being publicly
criticized by the two dissenting members of the five member Com-
mission.84
- 78 Continental (Order issued April 2, 1962); Campbell-Taggart (Order issued
1967); American Bakeries (Order issued Sept. 14, 1966); Federated Department Stores
(Order issued Aug. 5, 1965); Broadway-Hale Stores (Order issued April 20, 1966);
May Department Stores (Order issued Sept. 9, 1966).
79 Campbell Taggart Associated Bakeries, Inc., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRun
RaG. REP. 'j 17,626 at 22,891 (FTC 1967). (dissenting statements of Commissioners
Jones and Reilly).
SO Tnm CEL R -KEFAUVER Acr: SIXTLEN YEARS OF ENFORCEME.T, supra note 45,
at 7.
81 Id.
82 FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 586 (1967); General Foods Corp. v.
FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1967); Ekco Products Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th
Cir. 1965).
83 See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,858 at 23,215 (FTC 1967), Order accepting agreement containing order to cease
and desist (acquisition of J.A. Folger & Co, the country's largest independent coffee
company); W. R. Grace & Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,891
at 23,237 (FTC 1967), order accepting agreement containing order to cease and de-
sist (acquisition of the country's third largest producer of intermediate chocolate);
Foremost Dairies, Inc., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TR"E REG. REP. 17,835 at 23,203
(FTC 1967), order accepting agreement containing order to cease and desist (acquisi-
tion of the only nationwide wholesale distributor of drugs).
84 See Proctor & Gamble Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE RE. REP.
17,858 at 23,215 (FTC 1967), (dissenting statements of Commissioners Reilly and
Jones). See also Reilly, Myths and Merger Policy, 12 ANerritusr BuLr. 605, 619-20
(1967).
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The principal product-extension case to date is that concern-
ing Procter & Gamble's acquisition of the Clorox Chemical Co.
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled for the first time on the
applicability of section 7 to a product extension merger.85 Ac-
cordingly, the significance of the decision can hardly be overstated.
The case involved the acquisition of the leading manufacturer
in the heavily concentrated liquid bleach industry by Procter &
Gamble, the largest diversified manufacturer of low-priced, high-
turnover household products, principally soaps, detergents and
cleansers. Procter was thus able to extend its line of laundry prod-
ucts by the acquisition of a closely related item, liquid bleach."0 In-
sofar as the Court was concerned the crucial findings by the Com-
mission were that the substitution of Procter for Clorox brought
about an enormous discrepancy in the size of competitors in the
liquid bleach industry, that this size disparity significantly increased
entrance barriers, and that it would discourage active competition
from firms already in the industry due to fear of retaliation from
Procter. Of considerable importance in connection with the proba-
bility of increased barriers to entry was the finding that the major
competitive weapon in the successful marketing of bleach is ad-
vertising. It was reasoned that Procter not only would be able to use
its volume discounts in advertising Clorox but that it could di-
vert a large portion of its sizable advertising budget to meet the
short term threat of a new entrant.8 7 The Court also gave weight
to the findings that Procter might induce retailers to give it pre-
ferred shelf space and that it might underprice Clorox in order
to drive out competitors and subsidize the underpricing with reve-
nues from other products.
The Court concluded that prior to the merger Procter was the
85 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U:S. 568 (1967).
86 Prior to the acquisition, Procter was in the course of diversifying into product
lines related to its basic detergent-soap-cleanser business. Liquid bleach was a distinct
possibility since packaged detergents-Procter's primary line-are used complimentar.
ily in washing clothes and fabrics, and in general household cleaning ....
The decision to acquire Clorox was the result of a study conducted by Proctor's
promotion department. [It) recommended that Procter purchase Clorox rather than
enter independently. Since a large investment would be needed to obtain a satisfac-
tory market share, acquisition of the industry's leading firm was attractive. "Taking
over the Clorox business . .. could be a way of achieving a dominant position in
the liquid bleach market quickly...." Id. at 573-74.
87 Id. at 575, 578-79. The Court also stated that possible economies cannot be
used as a defense to illegality. "Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen
competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of pro-
tecting competition." Id. at 580.
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most likely entrant and absent the merger would have remained
on the periphery, restraining Clorox from exercising its market
power. It further concluded that by the removal of Procter as a
prospective entrant the acquisition eliminated the leading source
of new growth in the liquid bleach industry.88
There have been expressions of disappointment from some
sources that the Court did not provide specific guidelines in Procter
for determining the legality of conglomerate mergers. Normally,
the Court will not go out of its way to enunciate specific doctrines
for the guidance of government agencies. It will do so when it is
apparent that the law enforcement body is off the track and needs
specific instructions in carrying out its functions. In this case,
however, it seems obvious from the opinion that the Court is in
full agreement with the Commission's approach to section 7 en-
forcement against conglomerate acquisitions. By not spelling out
guidelines and by making clear that all mergers must be tested by
the same standard, it has left it up to the Commission to make the
determination on a case-by-case basis whether conglomerate mer-
gers have the prescribed anticompetitive effects. It has thus im-
posed upon the Commission the task of preparing its own guide-
lines in future proceedings.
Whether much guidance has yet been provided by Commission
actions against product-extension acquisitions is debatable. Of the
three matters to reach the courts, two were quite similar in regard
to certain basic facts and possible adverse effects on competition;
all three were alike in that they involved acquisitions by a dom-
inant manufacturer in one field acquiring a dominant producer
in another, but related, field.
In General Foods Corporation a divided Commission found
that respondent's acquisition of one of the two leading steel wool
soap pads manufacturers, The S.O.S. Co., was very similar to the
Procter & Gamble - Clorox matter in regard to anticompetitive
tendencies.8 9 Upon appeal, the Commission's order of divestiture
was affirmed, the Third Circuit finding a number of parallels be-
tween the case and the Procter : Gamble - Clorox matter.90 In
Ekco Products Company one of the nation's leading manufacturers
of housewares-kitchen tools, tinware, kitchen cutlery, etc.-acquired
the country's largest producer of commercial meat-handling equip-
88 Id. at 580-81.
89 General Foods Corp., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE Rec. REP. 17,465 at
22,719 (ETC 1966).
90 General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1967).
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ment.91 The Commission ordered divestiture primarily on the bases
that the acquisition might serve to entrench monopoly, and that it
eliminated the substantial potential competition posed by the re-
spondent. In affirming the Commission's decision, the Seventh
Circuit pointed out, "[b]ecause of the unique factual situation here
and the lack of decisional guidelines, we limit this holding to the
facts of this case." 92
D. Reciprocity
In another key conglomerate merger case decided by the Com-
mission and affirmed by the Supreme Court, there was no sig-
nificant functional relationship between Consolidated Foods, a large
grocery wholesaler and food manufacturer and Gentry, a manufac-
turer of dehydrated onion and garlic. 3 Dehydrated garlic and
onions are sold to certain food processors, who in turn sell their
products to the food supermarkets. Because Consolidated bought
food products, it could engage in reciprocity with food processors
who need onions and garlic. This gave Consolidated a potentially
decisive advantage over other garlic producers. It was this anti-
competitive reciprocity that the Commission and the Supreme Court
found to be the element in this conglomerate merger that made it
illegal.94
Reciprocity opportunities arise not because of a direct func-
tional relationship between two merging parties, but because of
the way in which a large corporation may lengthen and pool its
buying power in order to make sales. Economists view this as alien
to the competitive process. 95 Sales should be made on the basis of
quality, price and service, not on the basis of reciprocity. Minimal
reciprocity may well be innocuous, but if it is practiced on a broad
scale by giant corporations, it will certainly pose a grave danger to
competition.
In one other conglomerate complaint brought by the Com-
mission, a potential for anticompetitive reciprocity was cited as a
possible adverse competitive effect.90 The challenged merger in-
91 Ekco Products Co., [1963-65 Transfer Binder] TRADr REG. Rr. 1 16,956 at
22,017 (FTC 1964).
92 Ekco Products Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
98 FTC v. Consolidated Foods, 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
94 Id. at 599-600.
95 See, e.g., Stockings & Mueller, Business Reciprocity and the Size of Firms, 30
J. Bus. U. CHI. 73, 75-77 (1957); Edwards, conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power,
in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 342 (1955).
96 Foremost Dairies, Inc., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE Rio, REt,. 1 17,835
at 23,203 (FTC 1967) Order accepting agreement containing order to cease and desist.
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volved Foremost Dairies and McKesson S& Robbins, one of the coun-
try's leading drug wholesalers. The complaint charged that the
prospective union would, among other things, damage competition
by permitting Foremost to use its position in several areas to further
sales of one of its products through reciprocal trading. The matter
was settled without trial, with the consent order delineating a re-
striction against the use of reciprocal trading agreements.
The Consolidated Foods case serves notice that an acquisition
posing the substantial probability of reciprocal purchasing in a
concentrated market is a likely candidate for government action
looking toward divestiture.97 And this writer wholeheartedly agrees
with Professor Broadley that "antitrust policy as to mergers in-
volving reciprocity should be part of a general policy of controlling
oligopoly power."98
E. "Other" Conglomerate Mergers
To the author's knowledge, the government has yet to clal-
lenge publicly an acquisition in which there was no economic rela-
tionship existing between the acquiring and acquired firms. Yet
these mergers account for nearly one-fifth of the conglomerate ac-
quisitions presently being consummated.99 To some experts, there
is a serious question concerning the application of the Celler-
Kefauver Act to the "other" class of conglomerates--amalgamations
contributing to overall concentration instead of specific market con-
centration. 00 Nevertheless, some of the criteria used by the Com-
mission and the courts in evaluating both the market extension and
product extension forms of conglomerate acquisitions-potential
competition and the raising of barriers to market entry-are equally
applicable to the "other" variety of conglomerate mergers. More-
over, at least one acquisition challenged by the Commission that
resulted in consent settlement could be considered as being akin to
an "other" conglomerate.' 0 '
97 See Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Shernin and Clayton Acts-From
Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 SrA. L. REv. 285, 328 (1967).
98 Id. at 329.
99 TH ELxR-K.FAuvER Aar: SixiT.EN YEAm oF E.NFORCFmrT, supra note 45,
at 7.
100 See Everette MacIntyre, Antitrust, Real or Fanciful, before Business Public Re-
lations Seminar, May 4, 1966; U.S. Aide [Ass't Attorney General Donald F. Turner]
Hints at Trust Law to Bar, "Super-Concentration," The Evening Star (Wash., D. C.),
April 15, 1966; Testimony of Corvin D. Edwards, Economic Concentration Hearings,
supra, note 4, pt. 1 at 44, 45.
101 Foremost Dairies, Inc., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TADE Rac. REP,. j 17,835
at 23,203 (FTC 1967). Foremost, a large dairy products manufacturer, acquired Mc-
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F. Unreported Commission Actions Concerning Conglomerates
The above recital does not do justice to the Commission's en-
forcement effort against potentially anticompetitive conglomerate
mergers. Within the past two years, a good number of "large" con-
glomerate acquisitions have been cancelled prior to consummation
because the parties were informed that Commission challenge under
Celler-Kefauver could be expected, or because the parties believed
that pre-merger inquiries initiated by the Commission would lead
to prosecutions. These matters involved all three categories of con-
glomerates. While the Commission is not always informed as to
which acquisitions have been abandoned as a result of inquiries, it
has noted "that during the calendar year 1967 some 12 large mer-
gers, each involving proposed acquisitions of firms with assets in
excess of $10 million, were dropped during the pendency of expe-
dited investigational procedures."' 02 The total assets of the 12
proposed acquisitions aggregated 2.1 billion dollars. 03 By the end
of the first two months of 1968, similar abandonments totaled $800
million in assets.10 4
V. CONCLUSION
The emphasis in this summary of government action against
conglomerate acquisitions has been placed upon Federal Trade
Commission enforcement activities. Such emphasis is demanded by
the record. The Commission has been much more active in public
examination of conglomerate acquisitions than the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice. Whatever public guidance exists
in this area of the law stems almost exclusively from Commission
actions. While conglomerate merger guidelines have been prom-
ised by the Antitrust Division for the past several years, they have
yet to be released.
Commission effort in the conglomerate merger area may be de-
scribed as a "holding action"-a series of probes that have pro-
duced some results which, through extrapolation, have given the
Commission a stronger hand to negotiate settlements of future con-
troversies. This approach has undoubtedly placed a rein upon the
Kesson & Robbins, Inc., the only nationwide wholesale distributor of drugs. (There
were, however, questions concerning reciprocal trading; and Foremost had a limited
interest, prior to the merger, in the production and sale of pharmaceutical prepara-
tions.)
102 Federal Trade Commission, Merger Activity Set New Record Last Year, FTC
Reports 3.
108 Id.
104 Id.
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conglomerate movement. Industry does take the government's atti-
tude into consideration when contemplating acquisitions. Certain
mergers have been discouraged or abandoned because of Commis-
sion statements or actions.
However, industry uncertainty about the law has not been
diminished. Is a sewing machine manufacturer a significant poten-
tial competitor of a producer of lawn mowers? Do his initial in-
quiries concerning internal expansion into the lawn mower field,
as revealed by inter-office documentation, preclude the option to
enter through acquisition? Will the test of potential competition
always be objective in nature and not subjective? Does the replace-
ment of a large market entity by an even larger company always
raise barriers to market entry and disadvantage established but
smaller companies operating within the market? Does a predict-
able increase in barriers to market entry alone render an acquisi-
tion unlawful? Must a corporation which emphasizes promotion of
consumer acceptance of its products through the use of prime-time
television forebear from the acquisition of companies whose prod-
ucts may be promoted in the same manner? Do sales dollars and/or
assets constitute relevant product markets when large corporations
contemplate merger?
Unless his matter fits within the square corners of a judicial
decision, the businessman cannot be sure of the validity of a pro-
posed conglomerate acquisition. Consent settlements offer only a
vague starting point for bargaining. Guidelines, in terms of assets
and sales dollars, are available only for food retailers. Advisory
opinions issued by the Commission deal primarily with failing com-
panies1 05 because of the procedure's unavailability for matters that
require extensive Commission inquiry.106
As noted, the Commission's primary approach toward meeting
the conglomerate merger problem has been the litigation of test
cases. Yet only four of these cases have passed through the courts.
One is of but slight import' 07 and one deals solely with reciproc-
ity..08 The remaining two portray similar situations.0 9 The other
conglomerate complaints issued by the Commission were settled
through consent orders before Commission hearings or after deci-
105 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, DIGESTS OF PE-M cER ADVISORY OP=ONs Is-
suED By FTC, (Feb. 13, 1968).
106 See 16 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1968).
107 Ekco Products Co. v. FTC, 347 F2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
108 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
109 FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); General Foods Corp. v.
FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1967).
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sions by the Commission. The recent trend has been toward simul-
taneous issuance and settlement of conglomerate merger complaints.
The section 7 consent order, perhaps more than any other
form of litigative settlement, is carefully studied by non-parties
and used as a guide to future action. It is also viewed as controlling
precedent by corporate counsel. While in public office, this writer
frequently read briefs or heard arguments in which counsel for
merging corporations contended that the Commission required such
and such a remedy in a particular consent matter and, therefore,
should require the same remedy in the matter under review. Often
the analogies drawn by counsel were correct on their face.
The short of it, however, is that consent settlements presently
offer little guidance to the antitrust bar and its clients. In similar
matters within the same industry, Commission settlements have dif-
fered.110 In regard to acquisitions involving industries similarly
structured and similarly plagued by trends toward concentration,
public relief has differed.'' In several matters, settlements have been
reached which, according to the Commission minority, were unre-
sponsive to the charges made in the complaints.112 Some conglom-
erate firms have been granted "one-last-bite-at-the-apple." Their ac-
quisitions have been permitted to stand in return for a ban against
further mergers. Others have been required to make "token" divesti-
tures or divestitures of properties other than the acquisition at issue.
And in some cases, the proposed acquisition has been blocked.
There is warrant to suspect that at this point in time, the Com-
mission, in accepting consent settlements of conglomerate merger
actions; decrees ad hoc public remedies on bases which are vague, ob-
scure, and, perhaps, idiosyncratic. At this stage of the conglomerate
merger movement, a substantial number of cases should be litigated.
The Commission's views should in some measure be derived from
comprehensive trial records and then evaluated by the courts. There
is no doubt that "[e]lucidation of reasonable and realistic standards
for testing conglomerate mergers is still an important item of un-
finished- business for the enforcement agencies and the courts." 118
110 Compare the Commission's settlements of market extension complaints In
the bread industry.
111 Compare the complaints and consent orders regarding market extension merg-
ers in the dairy industry with the complaints and consent orders concerning market
extension acquisitions in the bread industry.
112 See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRAns RE(, REP.
17,858 at 23,216-17 (FTC 1967) (Dissenting statements of Commissioners Reilly
and Jones).
113 Address by Commissioner Philip Elman, Clorox and Conglomerate Mergers,
Antitrust Law Section, American Bar Association, August 1, 1967.
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This is not to say that the Commission should declare a mora-
torium on section 7 consent orders. It is only advocated that the
Commission and industry be less prone toward acceptance of such
orders, and that when such orders are issued they should be ex-
plained. While a member of the Commission, the writer advocated
holding consent settlements of conglomerate merger actions up for
public approval." 4 It was also advocated that the Commission offer
its reasons for proposing acceptance of settlements of section 7 ac-
tions.1 5 When the Commission revised its Rules of Practice in July
of 1967, it provided for the public proposal of consent orders for a
period of thirty days prior to Commission acceptance; 1 6 however, it
has yet to deem warranted the publication of its reasoning behind
the acceptance of proposed acceptance of a settlement order. Such
exposition or agency thinking has long been advocated in the anti-
trust field." 7
Finally, this article cannot be concluded without acknowledging
that the Commission, when one considers its budget, has been doing
a creditable job. The service that the American taxpayer has received
to date greatly exceeds his payment when one reflects that the Com-
mission may not even spare one-tenth of its very limited budget to
combat a problem that covers the breadth of American industry.
134 See, e.g., Reilly, Myths and Merger Policy, 12 A.xrrrraus BULL 605, 620,
(1967); Address by John Reilly, Mergers and the Law - 1967, Antitrust Section, Ohio
State Bar Association, May 12, 1967.
115 Id.
116 16 C.F.R. § 2.34 (1968).
117 See, e.g., Phillips, The Consent Decree in Antitrust Enforcement, 18 WAtEs.
LER L. REv. 39, 54 (1961); GOLDBERG, THE CONsMENT DEcE: ITs FO1.SULA'.roN AZo
UsE 70 (1962).
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